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INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 2016, the headlines of major publications began
announcing that Donald Trump had successfully completed a “hostile
takeover” of the Republican Party.1 What was meant by this claim, it
appears, is that Trump had replaced the Grand Old Party’s commitment to
free markets, balanced budgets, and low taxes with promises of “universal
health-care, tax hikes on hedge-fund managers, and a $1 trillion
infrastructure plan.”2 And rather than finding himself a dissenter within a
party that rejected his views, Trump instead skyrocketed to the top of the
party, which accordingly transformed itself to accommodate him. Whether
this appraisal is accurate or not,3 it reflects concern about the associational
*
Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Judge Ben C. Green Professor
of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to Chris Lund for early encouragement
and advice on this paper and to Chad Flanders for thoughtful feedback and suggestions. Many thanks
also to John Inazu, Daniel Epps, and the Washington University Law Review students.
1.
See, e.g., Eric Levitz, Donald Trump’s Not-So-Hostile Takeover of the GOP, INTELLIGENCER
(Dec. 24, 2019), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/12/trump-takeover-gop-impeachment-prescripti
on-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/3KLX-Q5DZ]; Joe Scarborough, Opinion, Donald Trump’s Hostile
Takeover of the Republican Party, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2016, 10:57 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2016/03/01/donald-trumps-hostile-takeover-of-the-republican-party/ [https
://perma.cc/MA78-RXMX]; Ryan Lizza, Donald Trump’s Hostile Takeover of the G.O.P., NEW
YORKER (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/donald-trumps-hostile-take
over-of-the-g-o-p [https://perma.cc/9THA-JQR2].
2.
Levitz, supra note 1.
3.
At least one source suggests it is not. Levitz, supra note 1.
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integrity of a voluntary private organization—the Republican Party—and it
suggests that some forms of organizational transformation could be
problematic.
The same concern might arise regarding other private associations,
including religious associations. Of course, all organizations undergo
change. Notwithstanding stereotypical assumptions about religious
organizations as ossified and impermeable to change, reform and
transformation are endemic to religious communities, which inevitably
partake in “an ongoing, dynamic relationship with the realities of everyday
life.”4 Often, change occurs because of external events or pressures, which
lead to internal disputes and, perhaps, the organization adopting new
leadership and new values. For example, debates over pressing social issues
such as slavery in the nineteenth century and same-sex marriage in the
twenty-first century have permeated religious communities, leading
ultimately to changed beliefs and sometimes schisms within congregations.5
Given that some transformation is inevitable and universal within religious
and other voluntary organizations, it would be unwarranted to assume that
all change within a religious organization that touches on the structure or
teachings of that religion is necessarily problematic.
Moreover, it might appear at first glance that outsiders to those
organizations—including the government—have no interest in either
encouraging or discouraging such change. But perhaps the matter is not so
simple. In fact, several constitutional doctrines appear to be aimed at
protecting against some forms of organizational transformation, particularly
for religious organizations. Yet, courts applying those doctrines rarely ask
some of the difficult questions underlying this concern for associational
integrity. For example, when does organizational transformation constitute

4.
Robert Orsi, Everyday Miracles: The Study of Lived Religion, in LIVED RELIGION IN
AMERICA: TOWARD A HISTORY OF PRACTICE 3, 7 (David D. Hall ed., 1997); see also id. at 11–12
(describing an incorrect view of religion as “a phenomenon of closure and stasis”); Madhavi Sunder,
Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1423 (2003) [hereinafter Sunder, Veil] (“While traditional
theories of religion as a sphere of injustice held religious beliefs to be unchanging, contemporary
theorists argue that, in fact, religion is much more internally contested and subject to reasoned argument
and change than earlier theorists acknowledged.”); Terrance R. Kelly, Canaanites, Catholics and the
Constitution: Developing Church Doctrine, Secular Law and Women Priests, 7 RUTGERS J.L. &
RELIGION 3, 9 (2005) (“Church doctrine is a living organism. It responds to challenges across time and
cultures.”). Professor Kelly notes that Roman Catholic scholars are somewhat resistant to the notion that
Church teachings, which are labeled “infallible,” can subsequently change; change has, however,
occurred with regularity. Id. at 9–21.
5.
See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 690–91 (1871); Meg Anderson, United Methodist
Church Announces Proposal to Split over Gay Marriage, NPR (Jan. 4, 2020, 1:56 PM), https://www.npr
.org/2020/01/04/793614135/united-methodist-church-announces-proposal-to-split-over-gay-marriage
[https://perma.cc/38NR-MFHM].
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a “hostile takeover”? And why, exactly, is this form of transformation a
cause for concern?
This Article aims to grapple with these difficult questions about the
meaning of hostile takeover, as well as about whether the state should care
about it—that is, whether the state should ever act either to prevent or to
encourage hostile takeover. Part I of this Article attempts to define hostile
takeover in the context of religious organizations and compares it to the
concept of hostile takeover in some secular contexts. Part II then considers
what the position of the state should be vis-à-vis hostile takeover of religious
organizations. This Article ultimately concludes that the state has only a
very limited interest in either the facilitation or the prevention of hostile
takeover.
I. DEFINING HOSTILE TAKEOVER
The first task of this paper is to define the concept of “hostile takeover.”
As explained in Part I.A., the term “hostile takeover” was first used by the
Supreme Court in the context of religious organizations in the 2010 case
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings
College of the Law v. Martinez.6 While that case dealt primarily with
freedom of speech and association, rather than religious freedom, I argue in
Part I.B. that the concept of hostile takeover plays a broader role in both
Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause doctrines, as well as in other
First Amendment contexts. Finally, Part I.C. highlights some fundamental
questions about the scope and meaning of hostile takeover.
A. CLS v. Martinez
The U.S. Supreme Court introduced the concept of “hostile takeover” in
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings
College of the Law v. Martinez, which involved a challenge by a student
chapter of the national organization Christian Legal Society (CLS) to a
public law school’s nondiscrimination policy requiring Registered Student
Organizations (RSOs), which enjoyed certain benefits from the university,
to accept any student who wished to join as a member or seek a leadership
6.
561 U.S. 661 (2010). “Hostile takeover” in the context of religious and other voluntary
associations borrows from the concept of hostile takeover in the corporate law context. In corporate law,
a hostile takeover is generally defined as a corporate acquisition that takes place without the consent of
the target company’s board of directors. See, e.g., Bradley R. Aronstam, The Interplay of Blasius and
Unocal—A Compelling Problem Justifying the Call for Substantial Change, 81 OR. L. REV. 429, 433–
34, 434 n.21 (2002). In this Article, the term “hostile takeover” is used in a slightly different sense, to
refer to an ill-defined type of change in the structure or beliefs of a religious or other voluntary
association.
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position within the organization.7 This condition posed a problem for CLS,
because it embraced very specific views about marriage and sexuality,
including a belief that homosexuality was immoral.8 Because the
organization’s rules required members to sign an affirmation of faith and
excluded those who engaged in “unrepentant homosexual conduct,” it could
not comply with the so-called “all-comers” policy and was consequently
excluded from the benefits of being an RSO (although it was still permitted
to operate and use some of the school’s resources).9 While continuing to
function outside of the RSO system, CLS also brought suit against the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, claiming that the
school’s enforcement of the policy against it violated CLS’s rights of free
speech, expressive association, and religious free exercise.10
In the U.S. Supreme Court, the case revolved primarily around CLS’s
free-speech claim, which the Court ultimately rejected. The Court found that
the law school’s RSO program constituted a “limited public forum” for
speech.11 As such, the Court held that the law school’s policy only had to be
reasonable and viewpoint neutral in order to be constitutional.12 The Court
found that the policy met both requirements.13 It then made quick work of
CLS’s other two claims. The Court first subsumed the expressiveassociation claim under the free-speech claim.14 Then, almost in passing, it
dismissed the free-exercise claim because, under Employment Division v.
Smith, the policy was neutral and generally applicable and therefore
constitutional.15
Because CLS involved the student organization context and the issue of
what sort of support or recognition from the law school CLS would receive,
Hastings’s policy was subject to a lower level of scrutiny than the Court
would have applied to governmental interference with a freestanding
association. In other words, in CLS v. Martinez, the student organization
was seeking financial and other forms of support from the law school, which

7.
CLS, 561 U.S. at 675. The policy as written simply forbids discrimination “on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation.” Id. at 670.
However, the parties stipulated earlier in the litigation that the effect of this policy was to “allow any
student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in the organization, regardless of
[her] status or beliefs,” and the Supreme Court treated that stipulation as binding. Id. at 675–76
(alteration in original).
8.
Id. at 672.
9.
Id. at 672–73.
10.
Id. at 673.
11.
Id. at 682.
12.
Id. at 685.
13.
Id. at 697.
14.
Id. at 680–83.
15.
Id. at 697 n.27.
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gave the law school greater control over its policies.16 The decision in CLS
should not, therefore, be taken to mean that the state would be similarly free
to impose a comparable membership policy on religious groups outside of
school walls.17
The concern about hostile takeover was raised by CLS in its principal
brief. As CLS explained, the all-comers rule burdened its ability to “control
and present its message,” because it could not prevent students who oppose
that message from joining the group and diluting or undermining that
message publicly.18 “If non-Christians could walk in and insist on taking a
turn leading one of CLS’s weekly studies of the Bible—a book whose
interpretation is not free from controversy,” CLS explained, “those
meetings would cease to be an expression of CLS’s beliefs . . . .”19 The
majority opinion in CLS largely dismissed this possibility as “more
hypothetical than real,” noting that there had been no “history or prospect
of RSO hijackings at” the law school.20 Justice Kennedy, who concurred,
similarly noted that there was no evidence of such a phenomenon, but he
suggested that this would be a different case—a “substantial” one—if the
policy were “either designed or used to infiltrate the group or challenge its
leadership in order to stifle its views,” or if the all-comers policy had the
“purpose or effect” of facilitating such takeover.21 CLS, however, argued
that because of the all-comers policy,
[e]ither no outsiders will join CLS, in which case the College’s Policy
is essentially symbolic and does not serve any concrete legitimate
purpose, or the opposite: Heterodox or hostile students will join and
seek to assume leadership positions, in which case CLS’s message
will be distorted, and quite possibly sabotaged.22
Justice Alito’s dissent took CLS’s suggestion far more seriously, while
acknowledging that it was not his primary concern.23 Specifically, Justice
Alito worried that “[a] true accept-all-comers policy permits small
unpopular groups to be taken over by students who wish to change the views
that the group expresses,” presumably because larger groups, which are by
16.
Id. at 680–83.
17.
See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (holding that application of
a nondiscrimination law that would force the Boy Scouts to accept a gay scoutmaster, in contravention
of its beliefs, unconstitutionally infringes the Scouts’ freedom of association).
18.
Brief for Petitioner at 30–31, CLS, 561 U.S. 661 (No. 08-1371), 2010 WL 711183, at *30–
31.
19.
Id. at 30.
20.
CLS, 561 U.S. at 692.
21.
Id. at 706 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
22.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at *31.
23.
CLS, 561 U.S. at 740–41 (Alito, J., dissenting).

1838

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:1833

definition more popular, would be harder for a small group of committed
antagonists to dominate.24 He also criticized Justice Kennedy’s caveat as
incoherent and difficult to apply: “The Court holds that the accept-allcomers policy is viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purposes
of the RSO forum. How could those characteristics be altered by a change
in the membership of one of the forum’s registered groups? No explanation
is apparent.”25 In other words, according to Justice Alito, the imagined
change in membership does not make the all-comers policy any less
viewpoint-neutral, and it does not make it any less reasonable in relation to
the purposes of the limited public form.26
Justice Alito also acknowledged that hostile takeover will not necessarily
be self-evident from the group’s change in membership, or from any other
objectively verifiable factors. For example, Justice Alito described a
hypothetical scenario in which students who are hostile to the group’s
message “joined CLS, elected officers who shared their views, ended the
group’s affiliation with the national organization, and changed the group’s
message.”27 Does this constitute hostile takeover or simply normal and
healthy change in the group’s identity through prescribed organizational
channels? In Justice Alito’s elegant formulation, “[w]hether a change
represents reform or transformation may depend very much on the eye of
the beholder.”28
The concern about hostile takeover thus appears to focus not so much on
the autonomy of the organization to choose its own leaders and shape its
own message without government interference—a concern that was surely
at the center of CLS’s claims—but rather on the integrity of the
organization. An interest in autonomy is an interest in conducting one’s own
affairs independently of intervention from the state.29 An interest in
associational or organizational integrity, as the term is used here, is an
organization’s interest in maintaining its existing identity, mission, or
message. It is a concern about preventing hostile takeover that results in a
change in the structure or beliefs of the association. As this Article argues,
protecting institutional autonomy may have the effect of protecting
institutional integrity, but that is not always the case. In some cases,
24.
Id. Justice Alito noted that CLS had only seven members one year, so it would not take very
many hostile students to join that group and overwhelm its prior membership. Id. at 740.
25.
Id. at 740.
26.
Perhaps Justice Kennedy was viewing the “reasonableness” prong of the test as the tool that
courts could use to strike down policies having the purpose or effect of facilitating hostile takeover.
27.
CLS, 561 U.S. at 740 (Alito, J., dissenting).
28.
Id.
29.
See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Rethinking the Value of
Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949, 1001 (2004).
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enforcing a “hands-off” stance for the state with respect to religious
institutions may actually facilitate hostile takeover.
Indeed, interestingly, the lawsuit itself came about precisely because the
group, which had previously been known as the Hastings Christian Legal
Society or the Hastings Christian Fellowship, underwent a significant
change in its governing structure and rules not long before the conflict with
Hastings’s policy arose.30 As explained by the district court, during the
2003-2004 academic year, the organization had approximately five to seven
regular members, one of whom was openly gay and two others of whom did
not subscribe to “orthodox” Christian beliefs.31 Then, the court explained,
at the end of that academic year, three new students took on leadership roles
in the organization, two of whom decided to affiliate the organization with
the national Christian Legal Society.32 That affiliation brought with it a
requirement that all members sign the Statement of Faith and conform to
CLS’s code of conduct, including the aforementioned prescriptions about
sexual morality.33 This history raises the obvious question of which scenario
represents a hostile takeover: the actual series of events leading the student
group to adopt the Statement of Faith and code of conduct prescribed by the
national CLS, or the hypothetical scenario in which a group of students
takes back the group’s identity by cutting off its affiliation with the national
organization?
One final point should be highlighted before moving on from this
discussion of CLS v. Martinez. Whether the decision was correct or
incorrect—and there is ample commentary on both sides of that debate34—
it does not address a much harder question lurking within the case.
Specifically, while focused on discrimination against gays and lesbians, the
30.
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Kane, No. C
04-04484 JSW, 2006 WL 997217, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2006), aff’d, 319 F. App’x 645 (9th Cir.
2009), aff’d and remanded sub nom. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll.
of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
31.
Id. at *3.
32.
Id.; see also CLS, 561 U.S. at 672. The joint stipulation of the parties further noted that
“[t]hese [three] individuals assumed leadership informally and no formal vote of the [organization’s]
membership was taken to elect them.” Joint Stipulation of Facts for Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment at 9, CLS, 2006 WL 997217 (No. 3:04-cv-04484-JSW).
33.
CLS, 2006 WL 997217, at *2.
34.
See, e.g., Sarah J. Kurfis, Note, In Defense of the Hostile Takeover: A Move Towards More
Democratic Student Organizations in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 457
(2013); Mark Strasser, Leaving the Dale to Be More Fair: On CLS v. Martinez and First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 235, 235 (2012) (“[T]he Martinez reasoning and result make
the best of a jurisprudence that has lost its moorings.”); Zachary R. Cormier, Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez: The Death Knell of Associational Freedom on the College Campus, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 287 (2011) (criticizing the decision for erasing associational rights); Richard A. Epstein, Church
and State at the Crossroads: Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 105, 110
(criticizing the decision on multiple grounds).
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Court did not directly engage with the fact that a nondiscrimination rule
forbidding discrimination on various protected grounds, including religion,
forces religious organizations to accept members, and even leaders, who do
not share the group’s doctrinal beliefs. This possibility, which is implicit in
the Court’s rejection of the hostile takeover scenario, unquestionably
imposes a unique burden on religious organizations, unlike those imposed
on secular groups for whom religious discrimination is not central to their
message. Of course, the decision to ignore this issue can be explained by
the Court’s decision to accept the parties’ stipulation that the
nondiscrimination policy was actually an all-comers policy. However, the
possibility of enforcing religious nondiscrimination policies against
religious groups raises significant questions at the heart of the idea of hostile
takeover.
Consider, for example, InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v.
University of Iowa,35 a case decided after CLS that involved the claim of a
Christian student organization that the university’s anti-discrimination
policy violated its First Amendment rights.36 The organization argued that
its religious free exercise rights were violated by the university rule
providing that it could not discriminate on the basis of religion, even in
selecting its leaders. As the group explained, InterVarsity’s “officers are its
religious leaders who minister to its members, personify its beliefs, and play
an important role in conveying InterVarsity’s religious message and
carrying out its religious mission;” thus, interfering with the group’s ability
to select its own leaders is tantamount to undermining the group’s “right to
shape its own faith and mission.”37 As discussed below, at the heart of the
concept of hostile takeover is a concern about attacking a group’s mission
and message by interfering with its leadership and membership policies in
a way that encourages or enables outsiders to shape those policies, and
InterVarsity arguably represents one scenario in which courts may actually
wish to avoid facilitating a hostile takeover.
B. Hostile Takeover Outside of CLS
The fear of hostile takeover is admittedly not central to the reasoning or
holding in the CLS case itself. Antipathy toward the scenario it describes,
however, may be understood to ground various First Amendment doctrines
35.
408 F. Supp. 3d 960 (S.D. Iowa 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-3389 (8th Cir. Nov. 5, 2019).
36.
Id. at 960.
37.
Id. at 985 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
171, 188–89 (2012)). The district court in InterVarsity rejected the group’s free exercise claim, however,
finding that it was subject only to the same public-forum analysis as the group’s free-speech and freeassociation rights. Id. at 987.

2020]

RECONSIDERING HOSTILE TAKEOVER

1841

in differing contexts. Fundamentally, the concern about hostile takeover
may be understood to reflect the fact that an organization’s membership and
(especially) its leadership not only convey but also help to constitute its
message; the group’s messengers embody its message, and the group must
be free to ensure that those it has chosen to carry its message are doing so
effectively.38 As Chad Flanders explains, a group’s leader is its “‘standardbearer’ or ‘ambassador.’”39 Thus, “[i]f the [group] loses control of who gets
to lead it, the meaning of that group is in jeopardy.”40 Both the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause have been mobilized in various
contexts to protect associational integrity against hostile takeover by
outsiders.
1. Other Religion Clauses Contexts
Numerous doctrines purport to protect religious organizations against
being forced to accept members who do not share, and may undermine, their
message. Of course, the Religion Clauses reflect numerous values and
purposes,41 and I do not mean to claim that institutional integrity is the sole
or even primary one. Rather, this Article makes the more modest claim that
one thread running through various Free Exercise Clause and Establishment
Clause cases is a concern about preventing the takeover of religious
institutions by those who do not share their missions and beliefs.
Most obviously, the ministerial exception, which is dictated by both the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, exempts religious institutions
from lawsuits based on the hiring and firing of their ministers—a category
of employee that is ill-defined but assumes some religious functions and
some measure of leadership within the organization.42 As Justice Alito, the
author of the principal dissent in CLS, stated in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
38.
Cf. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655–56 (2000) (“The presence of an avowed
homosexual and gay rights activist in an assistant scoutmaster’s uniform sends a distinctly different
message from the presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with
Boy Scouts policy. The Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose to send one message but not
the other.”); Chad Flanders, Religious Organizations and the Analogy to Political Parties, in THE RISE
OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 103, 105 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016).
39.
Flanders, supra note 38, at 105.
40.
Id.
41.
See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We
Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 855 & n.117 (2009) [hereinafter Garnett, Hands-Off
Approach].
42.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012);
id. at 192 (weighing “the formal title given . . . by the Church, the substance reflected in that title, [the
employee’s] own use of that title, and the important religious functions [the employee] performed for
the Church” in determining that a particular employee was a minister); see also Morrissey-Berru v. Our
Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 460–61 (9th Cir.) (outlining factors for determining when
an employee qualifies as “ministerial”), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 679 (2019) (No. 19-267).
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Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, “a religious body’s right to selfgovernance must include the ability to select, and to be selective about,
those who will serve as the very ‘embodiment of its message’ and ‘its voice
to the faithful.’”43 Were it otherwise, a woman who wished to be a Roman
Catholic priest—or, more troublingly, a woman who wished only to
challenge Roman Catholic doctrine—could presumably sue the church
under sex discrimination laws, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, for
its refusal to hire her.44
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also exempts religious
organizations from claims of religious discrimination, even when the
employee is performing non-religious functions.45 In a case involving a
custodial worker who was fired from his job at a gymnasium run by the
Mormon Church because of his failure to meet the requirements for church
membership, the U.S. Supreme Court not only held that the Title VII
exemption allowing religious employers to hire and fire on the basis of
religion did not violate the Establishment Clause, but also suggested that it
might be required, at least in part, by the Free Exercise Clause—that is, the
Court suggested that religious employers were constitutionally entitled to
an exemption from the anti-discrimination laws with respect to those
employees who were hired to perform religious functions.46 Moreover, the
Court observed, if courts were able to require religious organizations to hire
those who did not share their beliefs for non-religious jobs—and to decide
which jobs were religious or non-religious, “[f]ear of potential liability
might affect the way an organization carried out what it understood to be its
religious mission.”47 Thus, outside the public university student
43.
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 201 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Petruska v. Gannon Univ.,
462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006)).
44.
Id. at 189; cf. Ordinatio Sacerdotalis, Apostolic Letter of Pope John Paul II to the Bishops of
the Catholic Church on Reserving Priestly Ordination to Men Alone (May 22, 1994), http://www.vatican
.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_letters/1994/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_19940522_ordinatio-sacerdotali
s.html [https://perma.cc/U5LD-VVAM] (explaining the Roman Catholic church’s rationale for limiting
the priesthood to men). Of course, this is a far-fetched scenario; it is hard to imagine such an individual
who is otherwise qualified for the job of religious leader seeking a position purely in order to undermine
the rules of the church. The more common scenario in ministerial-exception cases is that the religious
organization does not officially discriminate on the protected ground, but is claimed to have violated its
own rules by discriminating in the plaintiff’s case. Jessie Hill, Ties that Bind? The Questionable Consent
Justification for Hosanna-Tabor, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 563, 574 (2015) (discussing Egan v. Hamline
United Methodist Church, 679 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), in which a Methodist church
allegedly fired its music director for being gay, in violation of church rules).
45.
“This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association, educational
institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society
of its activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2018).
46.
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 335–36 (1987).
47.
Id. at 336.
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organizations context in which CLS arose, religious organizations enjoy
greater protection from hostile takeover and are even constitutionally
entitled to prevent those who do not share their beliefs from performing core
religious functions.48
The so-called church property cases, in which the Supreme Court has
largely decided not to decide disputes over church property when doctrinal
questions are implicated, appear to cut the other way with respect to
institutional integrity, while foregrounding the importance of institutional
autonomy. For example, both Watson v. Jones49 and Presbyterian Church
in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church50 involved disputes over religious doctrine in which one faction of
the Presbyterian church, embracing doctrinal views that differed from the
traditional views, sought recognition, as well as the control of church
property, as the “true” church. In Watson, two factions within the church
had differed over the issue of slavery in relation to church teachings; in
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, the controversy revolved around the decision to
ordain women and to take positions on social issues of the day.51 In both
cases, the situation could be characterized as a hostile takeover of the church
by a particular faction. The Court’s decision not to intervene in each case
reflected, at least in part, an Establishment-Clause-related concern that
courts should avoid intervening in doctrinal disputes.52 Courts’ hesitancy to
delve into doctrinal disputes usually entails that they cannot take sides in a
hostile takeover situation. Thus, the Court’s embrace of institutional
autonomy, as well as its insistence that courts should not decide
ecclesiastical questions, was in tension with any interest it might have had
in preserving institutional integrity.
The 1976 Supreme Court case of Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for
the United States & Canada v. Milivojevich53 illustrates the tension between
48.
Because Amos dealt directly only with the question whether the Title VII exemption for
religious discrimination violated the Establishment Clause—particularly because it allowed such
discrimination against employees performing religious as well as non-religious (e.g., custodial) duties—
that case did not discuss the extent to which the Free Exercise Clause might or might not require religious
employers be allowed to discriminate against employees performing non-religious functions.
49.
80 U.S. 679 (1871).
50.
393 U.S. 440 (1969).
51.
Watson, 80 U.S. at 684; Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 442 & n.1; see generally
Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State’s Interest in the Development of Religious
Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1645, 1652–58 (2004) [hereinafter Garnett, Assimilation].
52.
Garnett, Assimilation, supra note 51, at 1655. Watson was decided before the Establishment
Clause was incorporated against the states, so it did not expressly rely on the Establishment Clause, but
it was later understood and interpreted by the Supreme Court to rely on First Amendment principles.
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 115–16
(1952).
53.
426 U.S. 696 (1976).

1844

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:1833

institutional autonomy and institutional integrity with particular acuity.
Milivojevich centered on a dispute between the Serbian Mother Church and
its North American diocese over the removal of a U.S. bishop and the
reorganization of the diocese into three separate dioceses.54 The diocese
claimed that the bishop’s removal and the diocesan reorganization were
both improper under binding church rules, and the Illinois Supreme Court
ultimately agreed, ordering the bishop’s reinstatement and invalidating the
reorganization.55 The U.S. Supreme Court then reversed, holding that the
state court had violated the First Amendment by “impermissibl[y]
reject[ing] . . . the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of this
hierarchical church . . . and impermissibly substitut[ing] its own inquiry into
church polity and resolutions based thereon” for the church hierarchy’s
determinations.56 Instead, the Court insisted, using jurisdictional language,
that the secular courts had no authority to override a decision by church
authorities.57
It was key to the American diocese’s argument that the church hierarchy
had allegedly disregarded its own rules in replacing the bishop and had
overridden the Church’s constitution in reorganizing the dioceses. In other
words, the diocese appeared to be claiming that the Mother Church had
engaged in a hostile takeover of the American diocese by improperly
replacing its leadership and restructuring its churches. Yet, in this instance,
the Supreme Court was largely unconcerned about institutional integrity and
appeared to favor a principle of institutional autonomy instead, suggesting
that courts should not “inhibit[] the free development of religious
doctrine.”58 The Court’s statement fails to acknowledge, of course, that the
“development of religious doctrine” could be a product of hostile takeover;
instead—in the words of the dissent—the Court chose to credit “any sheet
of parchment bearing the ecclesiastical seal and purporting to be a decree of
a church court.”59 In any case, the Court’s deference to the church’s internal
decision-making structure would seem to have the virtue of maintaining the
54.
Id. at 697–98.
55.
Id. at 698.
56.
Id. at 708.
57.
Id. at 713 (stating that deciding the issue “would undermine the general rule that religious
controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the
ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them” and that “ecclesiastical decisions of the
highest church judicatories need only be accepted if the subject matter of the dispute is within their
‘jurisdiction’”).
58.
Id. at 710 (quoting Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).
59.
Id. at 727 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist further suggested that the Court’s
refusal to review the underlying procedures leading to the Mother Church’s decision risked “convert[ing
the courts] into handmaidens of arbitrary lawlessness.” Id.
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neutrality of secular courts with respect to hostile takeover; thus, whether a
transformation occurs or does not occur, the state simply has no role and
cannot take sides in an internal ecclesiastical dispute.60
2. Secular Voluntary Associations
The problem of hostile takeover arises outside the context of religious
organizations as well. Nearly every voluntary association will profess an
interest in its own organizational integrity—that is, in preventing
individuals who do not subscribe to the mission or values of the organization
from usurping that organization’s membership or leadership. For example,
some scholars have noted the analogy between religious organizations and
political parties with respect to the constitutional protection afforded to their
identities, as against those who seek to compel inclusion and undermine
their messages.61 The Court has stated that the “inclusion of persons
unaffiliated with a political party may seriously distort its collective
decisions—thus impairing the party’s essential functions—and that political
parties may accordingly protect themselves ‘from intrusion by those with
adverse political principles.’”62 And much of the precedent relied upon by
CLS in its briefs in the Supreme Court involved the associational rights of
non-religious voluntary associations, such as the Boy Scouts.63
Although these secular contexts present helpful analogies, and in some
cases provide the relevant constitutional principles regarding hostile
takeover, it is important to recognize some significant differences. For one
thing, political parties are engaged in a public function and therefore occupy
a sort of middle ground with respect to their associational rights. The state
has a stronger interest in how political parties function and therefore may
60.
One might also argue that one goal of the Establishment Clause is to prevent “hostile
takeover” of civil society by religion. For example, case law forbidding government sponsorship of
sectarian religious prayer and symbols may be aimed at preventing a symbolic takeover of secular
government by particular religious groups. An extreme example of a religious takeover of civil society
is the case of the Rajneesh religious community, which occupied virtually all government positions in a
small town in Oregon in the 1980s and organized it under religious rule. See generally David E.
Steinberg, Note, Church Control of a Municipality: Establishing a First Amendment Institutional Suit,
38 STAN. L. REV. 1363 (1986); Janice L. Sperow, Note, Rajneeshpuram: Religion Incorporated,
36 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 928–32 (1985). This form of hostile takeover seems to me to raise very different
questions from those discussed in this Article, concerning the state’s stance with respect to the
transformation of voluntary private organizations, and I therefore do not discuss it here.
61.
See, e.g., Flanders, supra note 38; Garnett, Assimilation, supra note 51, at 1689–90; Pamela
S. Karlan, Taking Politics Religiously: Can Free Exercise and Establishment Clause Cases Illuminate
the Law of Democracy?, 83 IND. L.J. 1 (2008). Of course, this analogy is implicit in the discussion of
the Trumpian takeover of the Republican party with which this Article begins.
62.
Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981) (quoting
Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 221–22 (1952)).
63.
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 18.
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impose anti-discrimination norms upon them.64 Religious organizations do
not usually perform public functions—although it may be argued that some
religious organizations are sufficiently implicated in public functions or
public funding, such that the state has an interest in enforcing antidiscrimination norms to some degree. For example, religious hospitals and
universities receive large amounts of public funding, and this funding may
depend upon the religious institution’s agreement not to engage in
discrimination, even if its doctrinal principles were to require it.65 Religious
adoption and foster care agencies provide a service that is also provided by
government agencies and under close state supervision.66 Thus, the state
may have an interest in how the private organization carries out its work,
which may at times prevail over concerns about associational integrity,
though perhaps not to the same extent that the state is concerned with
political parties.
In addition, in many instances, membership in a religious group differs
from membership in other voluntary associations because individual
identity is often more tightly bound up with the former than the latter.
Religious identity is experienced by many individuals as more akin to an
immutable characteristic—such as ethnic identity or sexual orientation—
than to membership in the Kiwanis.67 Membership in a religious community
may be inherited and unchosen, rather than purely voluntary, and family and
social life may revolve around the religious community.68 Abandoning
64.
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 658–59 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 83–84
(1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540–41 (1927).
65.
Cf. Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1984) (holding that subjecting a college
to a requirement of nondiscrimination as a condition of receiving federal funds did not violate its First
Amendment rights); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983). The Court specifically
noted in Bob Jones that its holding—that a racially discriminatory university could be denied a tax
exemption—applied specifically to religious schools and not to “churches or other purely religious
institutions.” Id. at 604 n.29.
66.
Cf. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 160 (3d Cir. 2019) (involving a religious
foster care agency that was carrying out a “public service pursuant to a contract with the government”),
cert. granted, 2020 WL 871694 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123); see Flanders, supra note 38, at 115–
16.
67.
See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State,
2010 UTAH L. REV. 47, 51 (explaining that “[w]hen a group tells a person who she is, or supplies the
meaning of his life, the prospect of being cut off from the group is chilling,” and noting one commentator
has given “examples of individuals who are so deeply socialized in and so closely identify with a group
that leaving it would feel like killing off a part of themselves”).
68.
See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group
Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 117 (noting that “a significant portion of an individual’s personality and
identity often is tied to identification and interaction with a group,” such that “the threat of expulsion or
disapproval from the group understandably exerts significant coercive pressure on individual choice”);
see also id. at 161 n.290 (observing that, while remaining in a religious community is a voluntary choice,
“[k]inship relationships and membership in churches that practice infant or youth baptism are both
examples of groups whose members did not make an initial voluntary decision to join the group”).
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one’s religion simply because it does not reflect, or perhaps no longer
reflects, one’s deeply held convictions is thus “analogous to asking a person
to conceal his ethnic identity or to disavow his sexual orientation—perhaps
possible, but only at a profound personal cost.”69 Although it is conceivable
that some individuals feel the same intergenerational attachment to their
identity as, say, Democrats or Republicans, it is probably a safe supposition
that this phenomenon is less common in secular voluntary associations.
C. Identifying When Hostile Takeover Is Occurring
I have so far engaged in a largely descriptive account of hostile takeover
as a concept with a broad set of applications in the Religion Clauses context.
But several questions, both normative and conceptual, remain. In particular,
echoing Justice Alito’s concern, it is reasonable to ask how we can
determine whether hostile takeover has occurred or is occurring. That
conceptual question, and the numerous sub-questions that it generates, are
the topic of this section. This Part suggests that hostile takeover appears to
have both a substantive component—in that it matters which values or
beliefs are affected by the transformation, and why; as well as a procedural
component—in that it matters how the takeover occurs and whether the
institution’s own internal rules are disregarded.70 It nonetheless remains
difficult to identify when hostile takeover is occurring, and this Part raises
the possibility that the term is not actually a meaningful one. The next Part
will directly address the normative question of what position the state
should take, if any, vis-à-vis hostile takeover.
The examples from CLS v. Martinez—of a possible real hostile takeover
that took place before the litigation began, and of a second possible hostile
takeover hypothesized by Justice Alito’s dissent—reveal several lacunae in
the articulation of this concept. First, must a hostile takeover strike at the
heart of the association’s mission and values, or does any kind of change in
the beliefs or doctrines of the organization potentially count? For example,
the Boy Scouts of America changed its position on gay scouts and leaders
amidst internal strife and at least partly as a result of a change in national
leadership the year before. This change was probably not a fundamental
alteration in the organization’s mission or beliefs, however.71 By contrast,
69.
B. Jessie Hill, Change, Dissent, and the Problem of Consent in Religious Organizations, in
THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 38, at 419, 426.
70.
Thanks to Chad Flanders for making this point.
71.
See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 675 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that the Boy Scouts did not claim the exclusion of homosexuals was central to its message). After
litigating before the Supreme Court for the right to exclude gay scoutmasters, on April 19, 2013, the
Boy Scouts of America changed its policy and voted to allow gay scouts; in 2015, it voted to allow gay
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the hypothetical scenario envisioned in CLS entails a takeover by
individuals with not just a different or slightly more relaxed set of views,
but rather with a set of views diametrically opposed to those of the existing
association and its members. The original CLS could truly be said to be
destroyed after such a process. Thus, we might ask whether a relatively
marginal change could ever constitute a threat to associational integrity, and
where to draw the line between a minor change and a major one. In other
words, does the magnitude or importance of the change make the difference
between “reform” and “transformation”?72
The idea that the takeover must somehow strike at the heart of the
organization’s mission or structure is an appealing one. Given that some
doctrinal evolution over time is both expected and inevitable,73 it may make
the most sense to be concerned only about those changes that fundamentally
threaten a religious organization’s existence and risk eradicating it for all
intents and purposes. But at the same time, it may not always be easy to
determine which beliefs or structural elements are truly central to a religious
organization’s identity. For example, the Boy Scouts had initially tried to
suggest that the exclusion of gays and lesbians was central to its tenets,
before later abandoning that argument.74 And if the state or the courts are
expected to intervene to prevent hostile takeover—as discussed below—
then how are they to determine whether this is the case, given courts’
general discomfort with deciding questions of religious centrality?75
The recent evolution of the Roman Catholic Church on the subject of
divorce provides an illustration of these difficulties. The Catholic Church
does not recognize divorce and therefore teaches that remarriage after
divorce is adultery—which constitutes the most serious of sins.76 Because
scout leaders. For a brief overview of the events leading up to this change, see Marice Richter, Boy
Scouts Lift Blanket Ban on Gay Adult Leaders, Employees, REUTERS (July 27, 2015, 7:12 PM), https://w
ww.reuters.com/article/usa-boyscouts/update-1-boy-scouts-lift-blanket-ban-on-gay-adult-leaders-empl
oyees-idUSL1N1072OF20150728 [https://perma.cc/L3NP-NY36].
72.
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez,
561 U.S. 661, 740 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
73.
See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1391 (1981) (“A
church is a complex and dynamic organization, often including believers with a variety of views on
important questions of faith, morals, and spirituality. The dominant view of what is central to the
religion, and of what practices are required by the religion, may gradually change. Today’s pious custom
may be tomorrow’s moral obligation, and vice versa.” (footnote omitted)).
74.
Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 675 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75.
See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 457–58 (1988)
(rejecting the notion that courts should decide whether a belief or practice is central to a particular
religion and arguing that doing so “would cast the Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to
play”).
76.
Catechism of the Catholic Church ¶¶ 2380–84 (1993), http://www.vatican.va/archive/EN
G0015/_P87.HTM [https://perma.cc/KV2P-ZWX6].
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adultery is a “mortal” sin, remarried Catholics were long excluded from
participating in the sacrament of Communion (also referred to as receiving
the Eucharist).77 However, Pope Francis, who assumed leadership of the
hierarchical church in 2013, announced first in a private letter, and later in
what he declared an official teaching entitled to deference by all Catholics,
that not all remarried Catholics must be excluded from the Eucharist.78 This
evolution in the Catholic Church’s teachings was highly controversial.
While some within the church declared that Pope Francis’s new approach
simply resurrected dormant Catholic teachings about the primacy of
individual conscience, or that the new teaching was less radical than it
appeared, others declared the teachings to be “heresies” that violated “the
moral and sacramental truth of the faith.”79 Thus, although the rule that
hostile takeover must strike at the heart of a community’s most central
beliefs or practices is intuitively appealing, it is exceedingly difficult to
apply, especially since religious adherents themselves often disagree over
which beliefs are fundamental.
Second, what makes the takeover “hostile”? Is there a difference between
change within an organization that is organic and legitimate and change that
is inappropriate and perverse? The idea of hostile takeover seems to imply
a purpose or intent on the part of the agents of change to undermine the
organization. Perhaps it even implies bad faith on the part of the usurpers.
For example, part of what is so troubling about the hypothetical takeover
scenario described in CLS is the apparent evil motive of the students who
would join an organization simply to destroy it. Yet, again, the reality on
the ground is rarely so straightforward. For example, Richard Garnett,
discussing the role of the state with respect to doctrinal change within
religious organizations, has observed that sometimes governments “seek to
assimilate religious traditions’ doctrines and demands to their own,” and
adopt particular policies with precisely this purpose.80 Do such policies
constitute an example of the state acting in a way that facilitates hostile
takeover, and if so, is it because of the purpose behind the policy? And does
this imply that neutral state actions having only the incidental effect of
encouraging particular doctrinal stances—such as, for example, tying antidiscrimination requirements to receipt of public funds—could not constitute
77.
See, e.g., Tyler Arnold, Pope Francis’s Controversial Step on Communion for the Divorced
and Remarried, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 12, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/12/popefrancis-divorce-remarriage-communion-guidelines-letter/ [https://perma.cc/B9V6-9X24].
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Garnett, Assimilation, supra note 51, at 1652, 1677 (“[G]overnments like ours sometimes act
for the purpose of changing religious teachings. In other words, sometimes, promoting heterodoxy is
policy.”).
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facilitation of hostile takeover? A test for hostile takeover that requires an
inquiry into purpose or subjective motivation, of course, raises the question
of how one is to determine when the change agents are acting in bad faith
or with improper purpose—a notoriously treacherous path to follow.81
Third, if hostile takeover is concerned with preventing change that
fundamentally undermines or even essentially eradicates religious
organizations, one might be inclined to ask how we are to determine what
is the essence of the religious organization in the first place, and in
particular, who is entitled to define it. In other words, we might ask, “who
is the Church?”82 Otherwise, there will be no way to tell whether
organizational change reflects a fundamental transformation that is hostile
to the organization or, perhaps, a return to the organization’s true mission.
In Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, for example, did the modernist reformers or
the traditionalists represent the “true” church? Indeed, the question of the
religious organization’s identity has both a theoretical and a practical
dimension. On the practical side, it is necessary to identify which entity can
represent the church in litigation and other legal transactions. For example,
in one recent case, a dispute arose over whether the Roman Catholic and
Apostolic Church in Puerto Rico was the sole entity possessing a “legal
personality,” or whether individual Catholic schools in Puerto Rico could
also be sued for eliminating pension payments.83 The case was remanded
because of a jurisdictional defect, but in a concurrence, Justice Alito noted
the “difficult question[]”of “the degree to which the First Amendment
permits civil authorities to question a religious body’s own understanding
of its structure and the relationship between associated entities.”84
There is also the more theoretical question of which individuals or
entities within the religious organization should be permitted to control that
organization’s identity and decision-making on behalf of its members.
Supreme Court case law suggests that this question should be answered by
considering the structure of the religious organization. In Milivojevich, the
Court made clear that the decisions of the Mother Church—even if they
were in violation of Church rules—should have been left alone by the
courts, because the church structure was hierarchical and it was the Mother
Church that had ultimate decision-making authority over matters like the

81.
See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (“[I]t is extremely difficult for a
court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a legislative
enactment.”).
82.
Karlan, supra note 61, at 9.
83.
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. Acevedo Feliciano, 140 S. Ct. 696 (2020).
84.
Id. at 702 (Alito, J., concurring).
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appointment of bishops and organizational structure.85 In other words,
Milivojevich suggests that courts should assume a deferential stance toward
the religious entity’s articulation of its own structure (even, presumably,
when that articulation is one adopted in the course of litigation). To
oversimplify a bit, within hierarchical religious associations, change has to
come from the top down; within congregational organizations, it must come
about through a majority vote.86
This third question, about the identity of the church itself, implicates the
procedural dimension of hostile takeover. It suggests that the means by
which the organizational change occurs informs whether the transformation
is a hostile one. One could argue that change within religious organizations
should occur only by the means approved by the organization itself, as
articulated by the group’s authorized decision-makers. As long as this is
occurring, there is no hostile takeover, and the state has neither played a role
in facilitating the change, nor is it required to help to prevent the change.
There are at least two problems with this account, however. First, most
apparent hostile takeover scenarios involve change that is, in fact, brought
about through proper channels. CLS members voted to join the national
organization. The Boy Scouts of America leadership proposed, and the
national board voted to approve, the change in policy with respect to gay
scout leaders. Donald Trump won the Republican nomination fair and
square. Dissenters who refuse to follow the established procedure within an
organization usually do not get their way; instead, they remain dissenters.
A second problem is that this seemingly clear rule—defining the
propriety of organizational change according to the procedure by which it
occurs—admits of substantial ambiguity in its application. For example, in
Milivojevich, it is true that the disputed actions concerning church
leadership and diocesan structure were made by the highest authorities in
the hierarchy, but the essence of the American diocese’s complaint was that
the Mother Church had disregarded its own rules and violated the church
constitution, and therefore that it was actually without authority to take
those actions. Thus, as Justice Rehnquist explained in dissent, unless church
property claims “are to be resolved by brute force,” courts will inevitably
have to decide who is the proper authority within the religious organization
and what its pronouncements mean.87 There is no true “hands off” position
that the court can take when this issue arises. As Justice Rehnquist
continued:
85.
(1976).
86.
87.

Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 718–20
Id. at 729 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 726.
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We are told that “a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions
of church tribunals as it finds them.” But even this rule requires that
proof be made as to what these decisions are, and if proofs on that
issue conflict the civil court will inevitably have to choose one over
the other. In so choosing, if the choice is to be a rational one, reasons
must be adduced as to why one proffered decision is to prevail over
another. Such reasons will obviously be based on the canon law by
which the disputants have agreed to bind themselves, but they must
also represent a preference for one view of that law over another.88
Thus, even if institutional decision-making structures are to be respected,
there is no escaping court involvement in essentially ecclesiastical questions
about internal decision-making structure.
In addition, the imperative of respecting institutional decision-making
structures is made even more complex by the fact that those decisionmaking structures—including allocation of decision-making authority—are
often precisely the subject of the dispute. As in Milivojevich, courts can
rarely take it for granted that all parties will be in agreement about who has
the authority to make a particular decision; instead, parties tend to bring
disputes to court when they believe someone has acted without authority
and in contravention of the agreed-upon rules.89 To refuse to intervene in
such a case is not to protect “the Church’s” associational integrity or even
its autonomy—it is simply to preserve the status quo and allow “brute force”
to decide the matter. As Samuel Levine has argued, “in a case of a genuine
dispute between parties regarding church doctrine, particularly when no
religious tribunal has rendered an opinion, the majority’s rationale [in
Milivojevich] would not apply. In such a case, then, it would seem both
proper and necessary for a court to adjudicate the matter.”90 At a minimum,
courts will be required to make decisions about the decision-making and
dispute-resolution structure of religious organizations.
Ultimately, the idea of hostile takeover seems, like Eurydice, to recede
the moment one looks directly at it. Perhaps “hostile takeover” is more of a
conclusion than a premise—a label, like “judicial activism,” for doctrinal

88.
Id. at 726–27 (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 713 (majority opinion)).
89.
For example, in Hosanna-Tabor, the employee who was terminated from her teaching
position claimed that the church had engaged in numerous violations of its own rules and procedures in
terminating her. Brief for Respondent Cheryl Perich at 5–13, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 3380507, at *5–13.
90.
Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Questions of
Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 92 (1997).
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change that one dislikes or considers incorrect.91 This possibility suggests
that the concern underlying the specter of hostile takeover is not really about
the associational integrity of religious organizations, but rather the
competence of courts to decide ecclesiastical questions, voluntariness in
religious organizations, or something else. At the same time, however, there
may be a small subset of cases in which religious organizations—
particularly smaller, more vulnerable ones—are truly threatened by the
possibility of takeover. The next Part considers whether the state ever has
an interest in intervening, either to prevent or to facilitate such takeover.
II. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE STATE?
The preceding discussion suggests that associational integrity is not a
particularly compelling concern in and of itself. Due to the Free Exercise
Clause and related concerns about the autonomy of religious organizations,
it is obviously problematic for the state to order a religious organization to
accept a leader or a member not of its own choosing.92 One might
nonetheless argue that the state itself should have no role with respect to
encouraging or discouraging hostile takeover, and that courts should
therefore guard against the state purposely either facilitating or preventing
change within religious organizations. But what about adopting neutral
rules—as in CLS—that predictably have such a result? Or what about
adopting rules that do not coerce but strongly encourage such a result,
through the use of subsidies and other incentives (also as in CLS)?
These questions evoke the additional problem of determining what the
proper baseline is for identifying when the state has acted in a way that is
likely to effect change within religious organizations. Is the appropriate
baseline, as Pamela Karlan suggests, “no state regulation and no state
benefits”?93 Or on the other hand, do we have to acknowledge, as Richard
Garnett argues, that doctrinal development can rarely be truly free of state
interventions?94 As explained above, there is no way that courts can escape
becoming entangled in religious questions to some extent once their
jurisdiction has been invoked in the context of a dispute between two
factions of a religious organization.95 It becomes difficult to determine
exactly what positions government bodies can or should take to avoid
91.
William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1217, 1217 (2002) (referring to one commentator’s quip that “[j]udicial activism means a decision
one does not like”).
92.
E.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171.
93.
Karlan, supra note 61, at 10.
94.
Garnett, Assimilation, supra note 51, at 1671.
95.
See supra text accompanying notes 87–90.
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effecting internal change or empowering some groups within a religious
organization over others.
Various positions can be gleaned from the existing literature on the
autonomy and integrity of religious organizations. At one extreme, Madhavi
Sunder has argued that the law should take a generous stance toward those
who wish to change religious organizations from within and encourage
dissent in the name of promoting equality and justice within those
organizations. Thus, for example, she argues that decisionmakers should
“cease privileging the norms of religious elites and . . . instead place elites
and dissenters on an equal footing . . . when a specific dispute is brought
before a decisionmaker.”96 This proposal suggests that courts cannot simply
defer to the decisions of those currently in power and must instead hear the
claims of those seeking to make religious organizations more just. Indeed,
Sunder recognizes that religious identity often plays a unique and
fundamental role in individuals’ lives and identities. Thus, she suggests,
religious organizations should make space for dissenters, allowing them to
exercise their religion while retaining their identities.97 Under such an
approach, for example, women who wish to militate for equal rights within
the Roman Catholic Church would have a strong claim to retain their claim
to Roman Catholic identity while arguing for positions at odds with official
church dogma.98 The rights of dissenters—each one a potential participant
in a hostile takeover—might therefore deserve more respect, and the state
might be justified in seeking to encourage rather than discourage dissent.
Alternately, on the other end of the spectrum, the possibility of religious
transformation also gives rise to the prospect that members of a religious
community might find themselves suddenly at odds with official doctrine
that has recently changed because of hostile takeover of the institution.
Individuals who have committed deeply both to a faith community and to
its tenets may suffer distress, finding themselves unmoored at the prospect
of being asked to trade in their long-held values for brand new ones. The
potential harm to individual members of an existing religious community
that could arise from hostile takeover could suggest a concomitant
96.
Sunder, Veil, supra note 4, at 1466.
97.
Cf. Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 495 (2001) (arguing that, too
often, “cultural dissenters have either a right to culture (with no right to contest cultural meaning) or a
right to equality (with no right to cultural membership), but not to both”); see also Kurfis, supra note
34, at 476–77 (praising rules that encourage debate and dissent within voluntary associations).
98.
Cf. Gene Burns, Secular Liberalism, Roman Catholicism, and Social Hierarchies:
Understanding Multiple Paths, in RELIGION, THE SECULAR, AND THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL DIFFERENCE
79, 93 (Linell E. Cady & Tracy Fessenden eds., 2013) (discussing the Roman Catholic sisters who took
out full-page ads in the New York Times supporting abortion rights in 1984 and ultimately received
relatively mild reprimands).
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obligation on the part of the state to do what it can to protect against that
hostile takeover.
Other possibilities lie somewhere in between. Corey Brettschneider, for
example, argues that religious organizations should be subject to
“democratic persuasion,” but not coercion, to encourage them to adopt
values that are compatible with those of liberal society.99 In so doing, he
rejects the “static” view of religious freedom which holds that the state
should work to protect current or existing religious beliefs from state
influence.100 Brettschneider explicitly considers institutional integrity—
which he calls a concern about “religious extinction”—but suggests that this
concern is overstated, for two reasons.101 First, he argues that there is and
should be a dialectic of mutual influence between a religious group and the
democracy in which it is embedded.102 And second, he argues that there is
no threat to religious freedom as long as the state is not acting coercively in
nudging religious groups toward particular democratic values.103
Brettschneider’s framework suggests, then, that an action that would replace
a religious leader at the behest of the state is clearly problematic because it
is coercive,104 but an action such as Hastings’s imposition of an all-comers
rule on the student CLS group is a mere denial of a subsidy and therefore
acceptable.105
Taking yet another perspective on the problem, Richard Garnett argues
that courts should avoid involvement in intrachurch disputes to the greatest
extent possible, but not because of a concern about protecting the missions
and beliefs of religious organizations from transformation.106 Instead, he
argues that churches have importance as independent centers of value
formation and inculcation that is beneficial to society, and their ability to
perform this function without intervention from the state must be
protected.107 Although religious organizations perform a socially valuable
function, this aspect of churches justifies greater autonomy from the state
rather than greater regulation, because religious organizations can only
99.
COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY? HOW
DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY 143 (2012).
100. Id. at 145.
101. Id. at 157.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Cf. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S.
94, 115 (1952) (holding unconstitutional a New York law declaring the American arm of a Russian
church to be autonomous from, and not subject to the leadership of, the Russian mother church).
105. BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 99, at 119.
106. Garnett, Assimilation, supra note 51, at 1699.
107. Id.; see also generally John D. Inazu, The Freedom of the Church (New Revised Standard
Version), 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 335 (2013).
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perform this function of fostering and promulgating alternative value and
belief structures if they maintain a high degree of independence from the
state and its policy goals.108 Going further, Garnett has also argued that
religious associations possess a “sovereignty” so deeply rooted in our
history that the state simply lacks jurisdiction over intrachurch disputes.109
One final possibility is that these difficult questions could be avoided
through private ordering mechanisms. After all, corporations avoid hostile
takeovers through contractual provisions such as “poison pills.”110 Perhaps
religious organizations can similarly incorporate provisions into their
governing documents that prescribe certain procedures or results (such as
schism) in the case of particular kinds of doctrinal or structural change.111
This approach could have the advantage of keeping state actors out of
church property disputes and similar controversies arising from internal
disagreements, except perhaps in the most extreme circumstances. At the
same time, it is possible that such a solution would just push the dispute
back to a different level, such that opposing factions would call on the courts
to adjudicate the meaning and intent of those documents rather than
adjudicating the original dispute. It would likely also raise substantial
questions about the enforceability of those documents.112
None of these approaches presents an obvious answer to the proper role
of the state with respect to hostile takeover, beyond suggesting the relatively
straightforward rule that states should not directly intervene in religious
organizations to name their leaders or actively shape their membership.113
But such actions would be forbidden by other doctrines protecting religious
autonomy anyway. Regarding the imposition of neutral rules that lack an
easily identifiable purpose to infringe associational integrity, however, it is
not clear that the state should concern itself at all with whether the rule is
likely to foster or inhibit change within those organizations. Rather, this
108. Garnett, Assimilation, supra note 51, at 1699; Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter?
Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 295 (2008).
109. Garnett, Hands-Off Approach, supra note 41, at 861–62.
110. See generally Suzanne S. Dawson et al., Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42 BUS. LAW. 423
(1987).
111. Michael Helfand has written extensively about private ordering within religious
communities. See generally, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New
Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (2011); Michael A.
Helfand & Barak D. Richman, The Challenge of Co-Religionist Commerce, 64 DUKE L.J. 769, 773
(2015).
112. Cf. Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493, 516–17 (2013) (“Indeed,
any case in which parties incorporate religious terminology [into a contract] is susceptible to being
rendered unenforceable for fear of excessive entanglement with religious doctrine.”). Helfand gives
numerous examples of cases in which courts have abstained from deciding disputes because religious
terminology or doctrine was involved. Id. at 513–19.
113. Indeed, to the extent that an all-comers rule forbidding religious discrimination might require
such a result, this might suggest that both CLS and the InterVarsity case were wrongly decided.
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Article contends that associational integrity is in most cases not a cognizable
interest for the state or for courts reviewing the constitutionality of legal
rules.
CONCLUSION
A concern about hostile takeover of voluntary associations, and
particularly of religious organizations, appears to animate, at least in part,
several different First Amendment doctrines. Yet the concept of hostile
takeover eludes straightforward definition. It appears to have both
substantive and procedural dimensions, but it is not easy to say at what point
organizational change has crossed the line from natural evolution to
wholesale evisceration of an association’s fundamental values and
principles. In addition, it is not entirely clear what attitude the state should
assume with respect to hostile takeover—that is, whether associational
integrity is a value worth protecting in the context of religious organizations.
And if it is, it is not clear how the state should go about protecting it. Simple
rules of neutrality or procedural deference do not appear to provide a way
out.
Ultimately, it seems that the state’s interest in associational integrity is
highly circumscribed at best. In some instances, the courts may not be able
to avoid intervening in internal disputes over control of church property or
a church’s legal identity in a way that implicates questions about church
governance. In most cases, however, rather than concerning themselves
with protecting existing religious beliefs and hierarchies, courts should rely
on other Religion Clauses doctrines—such as those requiring courts to avoid
answering ecclesiastical questions and protecting the autonomy of religious
institutions—when directly confronted with disputes concerning hostile
takeover.

